This short paper argues that even though that every patient has the right and capacity to decide on accepting medical treatment, even if a refusal might risk permanent injury to his/her health or even lead to premature death, and regardless of whether the reasons for the refusal were rational or irrational, unknown or even non-existent, if a patient’s capacity to make a decision had been overborne by the undue influence of others, it is the duty of the doctors to treat her/him in whatever way they considered, in the exercise of their clinical judgement, to be in his best interests. In other words, the arise is whether the rights of a mother refusing to have treatment can prevail against those of her unborn child, whereas potential limit to the absolute right of a competent adult to accept or reject treatment was recognized by English and American courts.

Furthermore if, in a potentially life-threatening situation or one in which irreparable damage to the patient’s health can be anticipated, doctors or hospital authorities are faced with a refusal of an adult patient to accept essential treatment and they have real doubts as to the validity of that refusal, they should both in the public and the patient’s interest at once seek a declaration from the courts as to the lawfulness of the proposed treatment and it should not be left to the patient’s family to take action (1, 2). As for example, the case in France of a young Jehovah’s Witness who suffered a serious post-partum hemorrhage received wide attention: the woman was given a transfusion of four units of blood against her will. In giving judgement, the Administrative Court of Lille noted that the Public Health Code states that no medical intervention can be performed without the consent of the patient, but also recognized that it was the physicians’ duty not to respect the patient’s will when her life was in imminent danger (3). In order that a physician should not be indictable for the death of the patient he cannot merely desist from administering a therapeutic procedure. The patient’s wish (autonomy) not to receive treatment with a transfusion should lead to his/her leaving the healthcare facility either on his/her own initiative or on that of his/her relatives, as logically, so long as he/she remains there, the physician has a duty to save his/her life. In many instances’ parents had refused to permit a blood transfusion to be administered to their infant child due to their religious beliefs and concern about contamination. It is postulate that that in an emergency situation where a parent of young children is refusing medical treatment, a court can legitimately consider the best interests of the children as a factor in its decision as to whether life-saving medical treatment should be administered to a patient without his or her consent (4).

We can analyze the situation where the woman who upon admission, signed a standard consent form agreeing to the infusion of blood if it were to become necessary but later might chose not to receive a blood transfusion for religious reasons. To be clear, patient directs that no blood transfusions or blood products should be administered to her person under any (including life-threatening) circumstances (5). She gives no one, including her health-care agent, the authority to disregard such direction. saving patient’s life by way of the administration of a blood transfusion would immeasurably benefit the child and the family. Blood transfusions, including transfusions of whole blood, red cells, white cells, platelets, or plasma, should be given to the patient under any circumstances, even in the event of refusal based their refusal on their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses the teachings of which sect, according to their interpretation, prohibited the injection of blood into the body (6).

The question therefore arises whether could she be compelled to receive medical treatment because her death would cause the abandonment of her child? In hypothetical situation physicians determines that the patient is ready to deliver her child and that a Caesarean section delivery would be appropriate (7). Further amuse, that she consented to the Caesarean section, but not withstanding the routine consent form she had signed, she withheld consent to the transfusion of blood on the basis of her values and religious convictions as a Jehovah’s Witness (8, 9).